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Abstract 
 
       Rates of stock buybacks have recently hit an all-time high, and have gained a lot of attention 
from both the business community and the mainstream media. A polarizing debate exists over 
whether or not stock buybacks are harmful to the economy, especially in the context of stagnant 
wages and rising income inequality throughout the United States. The primary goal of this 
research paper is to examine what effect stock buybacks have, if any, on the innovation of large 
multi-national corporations. The analytical framework uses logit regression and ordinary least 
squares regression analysis to add to the debate surrounding the effects of share repurchases. 
Results show that share repurchases are correlated with an increased likelihood that a given 
company will increase its research & development expenditure in the subsequent year following 
the repurchase. This can be likely attributed to correlation between large cash holdings and 
repurchases as well as between large cash holdings and the pursuit of new innovations. While 
results add to the literature by suggesting correlation between research & development 
increases and share repurchases, additional paths for future research are proposed.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 1: Introduction 
 
In just 2018 there was over $1 trillion of stock buybacks, with over $460 billion of this 
concentrated in only 19 companies. Companies' use of stock buybacks as an addition or 
substitute to dividends is a trend that has been consistently increasing since the SEC's 
legalization of the practice in 1982. However, the profound increase in the use of stock 
buybacks, and its recent precipice in 2018, has led to a new height. This trend can be largely 
attributed to the large cash reserves of corporate behemoths, as well as the recent tax reforms. 
Furthermore, in an economy in which technological disruption has become more fast-paced and 
shareholder returns can be volatile, the use of buybacks as a vehicle for shareholder value that is 
more flexible than dividends has been gaining traction. The increased use of employee stock 
options as a compensation method has also been cited as a reason for the rise of the practice.  
While there exists a vibrant debate regarding the causes of stock buybacks and the 
intentions of companies that carry them out, one thing is clear: the increasing use of the practice 
has elicited polarizing responses. There are two main schools of thought surrounding stock 
buybacks: one which posits that they impede real value creation, and another which claims that 
buybacks are simply a healthy way for companies to reward shareholders, signal undervalued 
share prices, and manage debt. Those that argue against stock buybacks claim that that their 
extreme use is a form of market manipulation that creates short-term profits for rich investors 
and executives while impeding long-term growth of innovation, wages, and real investment 
(Lazonick, 2015). However, others hail the trend as indicative of healthy growth following the 
great recession and argue that the flexibility of stock buybacks in conveying value back to 
shareholders allows for more liquid and efficient financing (Chan et al., 2001). This debate has 
become increasingly important in our increasingly globalized economic system, especially in the 
context of a United States in which tens of millions of jobs have been offshored, wages have 
been stagnant for decades, and inequality is climbing to century-long highs.  
To contribute to the debate surrounding stock buybacks, my research objective is to 
examine the relationship between stock buybacks and innovation in the contemporary American 
economy. In order to do so, I will analyze the incentives for why companies engage in stock 
buybacks, as well as what the implications of the practice are for firms’ investment and research. 
This research question will be empirically tested using research & development expenditures as 
an indicator of innovation, examining whether companies that repurchase shares decrease their 
spending on research & development in periods following buybacks. In doing so, this paper will 
add to the literature by providing an analytical framework that helps inform the current debate 
surrounding the incentive structures around buybacks, as well as their practical implications for 
innovation in large multinational corporations. This paper is structured by first analyzing the 
current dialogue on the topic to contextualize the research question, and then setting up the 
empirical framework for an analysis between buybacks and R&D. Setting up and analyzing the 
empirical framework, results are analyzed and discussed. Study limitations and potential 
questions for future research are included in the conclusion.   
 
Part 2: Literature Review 
This literature review consists of several key sections, which serve to first introduce the 
reasons that companies have for buying back stock as the link between stock buybacks and R&D 
is examined. Sections 1 through 5 provide a background and analysis of the hypotheses 
surrounding company motivations, as well as an examination of the implications of these 
hypotheses for R&D expenditure. Section 6 then furthers the connection back to the main 
research question, and the conclusion of the literature review highlights next steps for my 
research, outlining how this paper will address the research question in light of the relevant 
literature. 
 
Section 2.1: Why Repurchase Stock?  
Within the two perspectives of buybacks being either destructive or constructive, there 
are many nuances informed by theoretical frameworks for why companies choose to repurchase 
shares in the first place. While there are legitimate reasons to buy back stock, there are also 
reasons that are illegitimate at best, and illegal at worst. Different sides of the debate surrounding 
the legitimacy of stock buybacks as a practice are informed by the credence to which economists 
give certain theories.  
There are several legitimate reasons to repurchase shares. First off, stock buybacks are a 
way to compensate investors at a lower tax rate than dividends since they are taxed as capital 
gains instead of as income. Secondly, they provide management flexibility while rewarding 
investors because once a firm commits to paying a dividend, it must continue to do so since 
terminating dividend payments sends a negative signal to shareholders (Iyer & Rao, 2017). 
However, this is not the case for buybacks since buybacks are not recurring; this flexibility that 
stock buybacks give managers is known as the flexibility hypothesis. Also, according to the 
signaling hypothesis buybacks show confidence of growth and future earnings, showing to 
investors that investment in a company's stock is better than any other asset the company could 
have invested in. They also allow a Company to increase its earnings per share if it can’t actually 
generate more earnings, since it can simply reduce the number of shares outstanding (Stunda, 
2014). Furthermore, if a company does not have positive net present value investment 
opportunities, it may be more efficient to invest retained earnings back into stock instead of into 
an unprofitable investment. It could be argued that this is an acceptable reason, but could also be 
argued that firms that are not innovating should not be allowed to boost their stock prices in this 
way. While innocuous reasons to repurchase stock may exist, there are undoubtedly several other 
reasons that are not legitimate and could be indicative of share repurchases being a corrupt 
practice. For example, companies may repurchase stock in order to simply boost stock prices in 
the short term at the expense of long-term growth and innovation (Tan et al., 2016). 
Additionally, buybacks may create moral hazard as they enrich company executives at the 
expense of long-term performance and innovation (Lamba & Miranda, 2010). Developing a solid 
understanding of the literature's consensus on these reasons for repurchasing stock is crucial to 
understanding the relationship between stock buybacks, innovation, and R&D investment.  
 
Section 2.2: The Signaling Hypothesis  
Findings in the literature provide important context for the signaling hypothesis-- the 
theory that firms repurchase shares because the market is currently undervaluing them. Evidence 
for the signaling hypothesis is important in informing the relationship between buybacks and 
R&D, because R&D expenditure does not immediately materialize as returns. Companies that 
invest in research experience time delays between R&D investment and the returns that are 
received from the new products that are the results of said R&D (Chan et. al., 2004). So, stock 
buybacks would then be a way to simultaneously provide shareholder returns during that interim 
and bring stock prices up to more appropriate levels that reflect the impending impact of the 
yields from R&D activities. Chan et. al. (2004) used cross-sectional differences in market 
reactions and long-run performance following stock buybacks to investigate three of the main 
economic motivations for engaging in them: mispricing, disgorging free cash flow, and 
increasing leverage. In their analysis of open market repurchases from 1980 to 1990, 
supplemented with cases from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) from 1980 to 1996, they found 
evidence of positive abnormal returns following buybacks to provide support for the mispricing 
(signaling) hypothesis, and found very little evidence for the leverage and free cash flow 
hypotheses (Chan et. al., 2004). However, this study’s sample period was over 20 years ago so 
it’s results may be less relevant in the contemporary economy. While this short-term support for 
the signaling hypothesis exists, clear-cut evidence for the signaling hypothesis is not ubiquitous 
in the literature. For example, while performing inter-industry comparisons on a sample of open 
market common stock repurchase announcements reported in the Wall Street Journal Index from 
1982 to 1997, Liano et al. (2003) show that long-term financial performance of companies that 
engage in stock buybacks varies by industry. Their analysis used a CRSP value-weighted index 
to reveal significant negative abnormal shareholder returns-- compared to non-repurchasing 
industry peers-- leading up to buyback announcements in the majority of industry groups, and 
found positive and significant excess returns over a one-year time horizon following buybacks 
(Liano et al., 2003). However, they found significant negative excess returns for two-year time 
horizons and insignificant positive returns along a three-year time horizon. They concluded that 
stock repurchasing firms may outperform the CRSP value-weighted index in the years following 
a repurchase announcement, they end up underperforming relative to their industry peers. The 
authors posit that this may be the case because firms announce buybacks when their industries 
are doing well, not necessarily when they themselves are doing well when benchmarked to 
industry peers. These results of diminishing long-term returns following stock buybacks suggest 
that firms may be signaling purely the short term and not the long term. To add to this, Chan et 
al. (1990) examined 167 announcements of plans to increase company-sponsored R&D 
expenditures from June 1979 to June 1985, matched up with announcement dates from the Dow 
Jones New Retrieval Service database. They found statistically significant short-term positive 
abnormal returns for firms after increasing R&D costs over a 248 day event window following 
R&D announcements, even while controlling for extraneous information and earnings declines. 
Additionally, they performed an analysis of cumulative abnormal returns by level of technology, 
a cross-sectional analysis off cumulative abnormal returns, and an analysis of managerial 
discretion and the possibility of limited dependent variable bias. They found that higher rates of 
R&D than the industry average leads to larger stock-price increases for high-technology firms, 
but neutral or negative effects for low-technology firms. Overall, they concluded the results to 
indicate that investors see beyond the short term earnings impact when evaluating firms’ stocks 
(Chan et al., 1990). This would indicate that investments in R&D would be better signals to the 
market than stock buybacks, which erodes support for the signaling theory. However, Chan et al. 
(1990) conducted their research on a sample from 1979 to 1985, when financialization and 
hyper-globalization were just beginning to pick up. Stock buybacks were illegal for half of their 
sample period, and, being made newly legal in 1982, they would not have seen widespread 
implementation after recently becoming legal. 
The results of Liano et al. (2003) and Chan et al.(2004) suggest strong evidence that 
companies use stock buybacks to signal good news and imminent large returns in the short run, 
but do not indicate that the signaling hypothesis holds in the long run. Furthermore, the context 
of high immediate returns to R&D announcements shown by Chan et al. (1990) puts into 
question the validity of the signaling hypothesis, because it could be argued that if companies 
really wanted to signal that their stock price will increase they would invest in R&D and/or other 
investment opportunities, not in their own stock. The lack of evidence for a long-term signaling 
effect has implications for buybacks' relationship between R&D because the timeline for returns 
on R&D is long, so the fact that the signaling hypothesis only is suggested to hold in the short 
run means that companies may not be buying back stock to signal long-term growth from R&D. 
Therefore, this evidence from the literature suggests that since buybacks are not likely indicative 
of long-term returns from R&D expenditure, stock buybacks may be a substitute investment that 
leads companies to actually spend less cash on R&D for innovative projects.   
 
Section 2.3: Option Funding (Manager Incentive) Hypothesis  
The signaling hypothesis exists as a reason for carrying out stock buybacks that, if used 
as a long term signaling mechanism, could be correlated with heightened R&D activity. 
However, the option funding (manager incentive) hypothesis states that stock buybacks are used 
by managers to increase the value of stock options to enrich company insiders. If this hypothesis 
holds, and company executives are using buybacks to enrich themselves instead of as legitimate 
indicators of signaling, that would suggest that buybacks are unproductive uses of company cash 
that are coming at the expense of innovation through investment in R&D. This would suggest 
that buybacks would be negatively correlated with future R&D expenditure, as firms that buy 
back shares are low on cash for innovative activities because they have spent so much cash on 
buying back stock. Indeed, several studies have suggested that manager incentives are a driving 
factor behind share buybacks. For example, in their 2010 study of 50 ASX-listed firms from 
1997 to 2000, Lamba & Miranda (2010) concluded that firms with relatively higher proportions 
of executive stock options outstanding are more likely to engage in stock buybacks to a 
statistically significant degree (Lamba & Miranda, 2010). This contradicts most traditionally 
stated reasons for engaging in stock buybacks, and suggests that instead of returning cash to 
shareholders or signaling to the market that a stock is truly overvalued, managers want to 
neutralize the dilution of earnings per share caused by their exercising of stock options. 
Although, it is worth noting that a limitation of this study was its relatively small sample size and 
sample period. When taken by itself, the results obtained from Lamba & Miranda (2010) suggest 
that executives may be using buybacks as a way to siphon off company resources for their own 
gain. However, other papers have provided results that counter this conclusion. Chan, Ikenberry, 
Lee, & Wang (2012) examined the relationship between insider trading and share repurchases 
using two methods on a data set of 9,976 open-market repurchase announcements recorded by 
Securities Data Corporation from January 1990 to November 2010. They measured abnormal 
long-term stock performance for companies by calculating returns for a buyback company 
against its benchmark of industry, market cap, and stock exchange peers in addition to focusing 
on return performance of a value-weighted, calendar-time portfolios on 12 month investment 
horizons. Their study is very relevant because insiders’ decisions to invest in a company and a 
company’s decision to repurchase stock are made by similar sets of decision-makers: those in 
and/or connected to senior management. Their results showed that market undervaluation is 
actually a main motive in buying back stock, and that insider trading is not correlated to 
mispricing-driven buyback cases. One limitation of this study was that empirical analysis used 
more heavily weighted shares with lower trading costs, which skewed the sample towards select 
firms.  
When contextualized together, the differing results obtained from Lamba & Miranda 
(2010) versus those obtained from Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, & Wang (2012) provide inconclusive 
evidence regarding the role that executive incentives play in the decision to buy back stock. The 
mixed evidence suggests that executive incentives may play a role in some cases, but is not 
necessarily a chief reason. This inconclusive evidence regarding the managerial incentive 
hypothesis has implications for the relationship between stock buybacks and R&D because it 
indicates that innovation and R&D will not necessarily suffer from management diverting 
company resources towards stock buybacks, but there is a possibility that it might.  
 
Section 2.4: Returns Following Buybacks  
The relationship between executive stock compensation and stock buybacks has not been 
proven to have an indisputable link in the literature, but the effects of stock buybacks in return 
drift following buyback announcements add to that portion of the debate. Many previous studies 
have had conclusions suggesting that company financial performance declines over the long-
term financial horizons that follow stock buybacks. This helps support the argument that stock 
buybacks are inefficient uses of resources that may be used to enrich company insiders in the 
short-term at the expense of R&D budgeting which would support long term growth. For 
instance, some authors have posited that some buybacks are deliberate attempts to mislead the 
market, instead of genuine and credible signals of confidence in and quality of the underlying 
stock. Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, & Wang (2005) specifically examined a subset of buybacks from 
companies who may have been trying to simply boost stock price despite no basis for improved 
confidence and quality. Their dataset consisted of a sample of open-market repurchase 
announcements from the Wall Street Journal Index from 1980-1990, in addition to 
announcements from Securities Data Corporation from 1985-2000. They separated firms by their 
earnings qualities, specifically focusing on firms that have lagging stock prices and high rates of 
discretionary accruals-- which indicates that executives may have been under pressure to provide 
a short-term boost to stock prices. Their results show that in the short term buybacks boost share 
prices because markets do not necessarily prioritize earnings as highly as they should when 
evaluating stocks. So, over long-term horizons firms with low earnings quality that repurchase 
stock suffer from poor operating performance and do not experience positive return drift. These 
results show that some buyback programs may be manipulative, and sheds light on why 
repurchase announcements are often met with skepticism from investors. In addition, Keasler & 
Bryerly (2015) used a multi-industry sample of 91 companies obtained from the University of 
Chicago Booth School of Business to show that the market capitalization of companies that 
engage in stock buybacks decline over long-run horizons of three, five, and ten years (Keasler & 
Bryerly, 2015). This corroborates the conclusions of Chan et al. (2005), by suggesting that stock 
buybacks are correlated with decline of key financial metrics such as shareholder returns, 
earnings, and market capitalization. 
 
Section 2.5: Flexibility Hypothesis 
When considering reasons for companies to buy back shares from the open market, 
another important theory is the flexibility hypothesis. This states that companies are simply using 
buybacks as a way to reward shareholders as a substitute to dividends, instead of as additions to 
dividends. Companies may choose to use stock buybacks for two reasons. First off, stock sales 
from buybacks are taxed at the capital gains rate, which is lower than the income tax rate. 
Secondly, once a firm commits to paying out a certain amount in dividends, investors come to 
expect that fixed dividend payout-- which can become constraining for the firm. Hence, the 
flexibility provided by buybacks is an incentive to use stock buybacks instead. If the flexibility 
hypothesis holds, it would suggest that increases in stock buybacks should not adversely affect 
R&D expenditures because companies would be spending that excess cash on dividends if they 
weren't already spending that money on stock buybacks. Through an examination of 174 
repurchasing companies on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange that engaged in 4,676 stock 
repurchases from 1991 to 1997, Firth and Yeung (2005) used a Tobit model to show that positive 
cash flows induce managers to buy back stock, and that the number of shares repurchased in a 
given quarter can be predicted through short-term historic and current cash flows (Firth and 
Yeung, 2005). The results of Firth and Yeung (2005) indicate that cash flows are key 
determinants of stock buybacks support the flexibility hypothesis due to the implication that 
firms are simply returning cash flows to shareholders with buybacks instead of via dividends. 
Furthermore, Howe & McFetridge (1976) studied the effects of depreciation on R&D across 
three major industry groups (Electrical, Chemical, Machinery) from 1967 to 1971 using 256 
panel observations (Howe & McFetridge, 1976). While using sales and after-tax profits as 
proxies for cash flow, their results suggested cash flows to be a key determinant of R&D 
expenditures, which corroborates the conclusions of Firth & Yeung (2005) by suggesting that 
buybacks are simply a more flexible may of returning company value to shareholders.  
Iyer & Rao (2017) used the 2008 financial crisis as a natural experiment for testing the 
flexibility hypothesis. Iyer & Rao (2017) examine this hypothesis through an analysis of how 
regular repurchasing and regular dividend-paying firms altered their payout policies in response 
to the financial crisis. The financial crisis was used because it placed pressure on the liquidity of 
firms throughout the economy, so the flexibility hypothesis can be tested through a comparison 
of reduction in payout polices of firms that regularly repurchase stock versus those that regularly 
pay dividends. The sample consists of a timeline published by the St. Louis Federal Reserve 
Board from 2000 through 2011, and authors break up their sample into four periods: firm 
classification period, precrisis period, financial crisis period, and postcrisis period. Their analysis 
found that regularly-repurchasing firms were more likely to reduce payouts following the cash 
constraints of the recession's wake, and furthermore that regularly repurchasing firms tended to 
spend more on R&D than firms that regularly payed out dividends. This suggests that by giving 
companies more flexibility with and control over their capital, stock buybacks allow companies 
to spend more on R&D while also rewarding shareholders in a way that they couldn't necessarily 
be able to do with dividends. However, a limitation to this study is that is important to consider is 
the fact that stock repurchasing firms tend to be more high-tech firms that have a lot of cash, 
whereas older "low-tech" companies have lower proportions of liquid assets; this means that it is 
likely that the repurchasing firms in their study were spending more on R&D in the first place-- 
so the relationship between buybacks and R&D could've been exogenous to the model. When put 
together, the conclusions of Howe & McFetridge (1976), Iyer & Rao (2017), and Firth & Yeung 
(2005) provide a case for stock buybacks as substitutes to dividends because the cash that 
companies spend on buybacks is simply cash that would have gone to shareholders via dividends 
if stock buybacks were not an option. This in theory significantly decreases the likelihood that 
buybacks would be substitutes to R&D.  
 
Section 2.6: Buybacks and R&D 
In the context of the hypotheses mentioned above, as well as the short- and long-term 
financial implications of engaging in stock buybacks, the literature has several interesting studies 
regarding the impact of buybacks, as well as other financing dynamics, on R&D. Much of the 
discourse in the literature surrounding stock buybacks focuses on the stagnating rates of R&D in 
the contemporary American economy. However, there are disagreements over whether stock 
buybacks cause slowdowns in innovation, or are simply sometimes correlated with them. Lev, 
Radhakrishnan, & Tong (2016) point out that as of 2014 R&D expenditures of large U.S. firms 
stagnated at 2.5 to 2.8% of GDP, despite non-financial firms having over $1.5 trillion dollars in 
cash. They point out that many executives, board members, and investors have an “accounting 
mentality” that leads them to consider R&D as an expense that reduces earnings with risky 
prospects for long-term benefits (Lev et al., 2016). The authors perform an analysis of R&D 
uncertainty using three factors: product uncertainty, process-cost uncertainty, and technological 
disruption uncertainty. They measure product uncertainty using volatility of future sales, 
process-cost uncertainty measuring future cost of goods sold and technological disruption 
uncertainty using future special items volatility. Their analysis shows that product and process-
cost uncertainties are lower than the uncertainty of tangible capital expenditures-- their 
benchmark-- and find that future special items volatility is significantly higher than volatility 
from capital expenditures. From this, they conclude that the major uncertainty from R&D is 
technological disruption, which leads them to suggest that firms should use cash to invest in 
R&D that will help them come out on top as their industries cope with technological disruption, 
and suggests that repurchases are short-sighted (Lev et al., 2016). Lazonick (2015) corroborates 
these claims as he gives a scathing critique of the very existence of stock buybacks as a practice. 
He argues that they are an integral part of the roots of financialization that has made American 
industry less competitive and has had extremely negative effects for American workers, leading 
to consistent periods of layoffs, along with economic decay in certain parts of the country, 
serious inequality, and terrible national divisions. Lazonick argues that "Old Economy" 
companies used to value career employees, and that these career employees' experience and 
proficiency in developing and using proprietary technologies (Lazonick, 2015). He notes that it 
used to be the case that research & development was the main source of intellectual property for 
most leading companies. He contrasts this with the large companies of today, that he argues are 
increasingly using financial investments and maneuvers-- such as stock buybacks-- to make up 
for declining research and real innovation by simply rewarding shareholders for cashing out on 
their shares. Lazonick concludes that the use of company retained earnings towards dividends 
and buybacks, instead of real investment, is indicative of a "failure of corporate executives" to 
develop strategies for "investing in the productive capabilities of the companies they manage" 
(Lazonick, 2015). Furthermore, he also argues that stock buybacks have essentially been added 
on top of dividends instead of replacing them, which implies that buybacks would be substitues 
to R&D. Additionally, Lazonick argues that not only are R & D expenditures declining, the 
actual research that is occurring for American companies itself is being outsourced to many other 
countries. Lazonick cites the fact that large increases in immigrant H-1B and L-1 work visas in 
the United States throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s spurred hundreds of thousands of 
high-tech workers to accumulate work experience in the U.S. that they could take back to their 
home countries. Some of these areas-- which include basic research, along with chip design and 
engineering-- are integral to any form of advanced research in the 21st century. Lazonick 
continues to prove his point through the use of observations of specific companies that have rates 
of stock buybacks that are hard to justify by any metric. Drug companies are charging far higher 
drug prices in the U. S. than in anywhere else in the world, but many of the largest drug 
companies have been continuously allocating a vast majority, if not over 100%, of their profits to 
shareholders through a combination of buybacks and dividends (Lazonick, 2015). At the same 
time health insurance companies routinely spend the majority of their net income on stock 
buybacks, allowing their executives to gain tens of millions in stock-based pay while average 
Americans pay some of the highest premiums in the world. Stock buybacks are even so 
pervasive that they exist in the face of perverse government incentives, as GM spent over $5 
billion on buybacks in 2015 and 2016 to acquiesce rich shareholders despite the fact that 
taxpayers lost $11 billion on the GM bailout only 7 years prior, and oil companies such as Exxon 
Mobil spend tens of billions of dollars on stock buybacks each year despite having government 
subsidies (Lazonick, 2015).  
 Chan, Ikenberry, & Wang (2001), on the other hand, take a very different position than 
Lazonick. They argue that repurchases can simply be viewed as "an investment alternative 
among all investment projects" (Chan et al., 2001). They reason that when managers' sense 
market prices are too low compared to true value, they enhance long-term shareholder interests 
by buying back stock, and they proceed to compare the benefit that shareholders receive from 
buybacks to the benefits that shareholders receive from any other profitable project that increases 
stock prices and long-term prospects for a company. Through this reasoning, they figure that 
repurchases themselves do not directly affect economic value, but are simply a response to the 
underlying economic inconsistencies between market value and a stock's "correct" value. They 
also figure that companies use stock buybacks instead of dividends due to the lower taxes 
associated with them. Kahle (2002) corroborates these ideas in a study that simultaneously tests 
the flexibility hypothesis and the option-funding hypothesis. The option-funding hypothesis is 
the idea that managers chose to buy back stock because buybacks do not dilute the per-share 
value of firm stock because cash outflows are complemented by shares outstanding. Through a 
sample of open market repurchase ranging from 1993-1996, Kahle (2002) examines the effects 
of several different stock option types, as well as many different control variables including 
capital expenditures and R&D. The results suggest that stock buybacks have become an 
increasingly popular form of compensation due to the increase in stock options as compensation 
for not only manager but other employees as well. These results for buybacks visa-vi managerial 
incentives may partially corroborate those of other authors who claim that managerial incentives 
are the chief reasons for buybacks, and that buybacks are a drag on long-term growth, 
investment, and research. However, Kahle also found that for the entire sample capital 
expenditures and R&D actually increase from the year before to the year after the repurchase at a 
statistically significant level. Because of this positive relationship between R&D and stock 
buybacks, Kahle concludes that repurchases are not signals of decreased growth opportunities 
(Kahle, 2002). It's also important to note that results suggested a negative relationship between 
announcement returns and stock-options, which is consistent with the option-funding hypothesis 
and suggests that markets know when managers may be using buybacks to simply boost the 
value of their options, and respond accordingly. This relationship between buyback 
announcements and share returns is highly contested in the literature as most papers that examine 
post-buyback returns, including Chan et al (2005) as well as Keasler & Bryerly (2015), find that 
stock prices increase in the short-term following buyback announcements.  
 Tan, Yu, & Ma (2018) examined the impact of internal capital markets on business group 
efficiency through an analysis of private versus state-owned enterprises in China. Their methods 
included a panel data set of 7,836 firm-year observations analyzed through a regression that 
estimated the effect of the ease of financing on over-investment and R&D underinvestment. 
Overall, the authors included that the functioning internal capital markets of privately owned 
enterprises allowed for financing flows that prevented underinvestment in R&D and increased 
overall investment efficiency. They contrast this with state-owned companies that did not have 
the same easy financing flows tended to have much lower returns on their investments. In 
relation to stock buybacks, it may be the case that stock buybacks are part of functioning 
financial markets that allow for companies to signal when they are investing productively in 
R&D and think that those investments will pay off, instead of being substitutes for R&D 
investment. While several empirical papers do not conclude that buybacks adversely affect R&D 
expenditures, this is not a ubiquitous result as the observed correlation between stock buybacks 
and subsequent increased, or unaffected, research & development expenditures contradicts some 
previous findings. For example, Hwan, Han, & Yoo (2012) conducted an analysis of the effects 
of stock buybacks and other financialization on R&D investment of non-financial Korean firms 
from 1994 to 2009. Their analysis used over 6,200 observations of panel data to estimate both 
the joint and separate effects of buybacks and dividends on research & development 
expenditures, as well as the effect of crowding-out effects-- in other words, the effect of 
relatively higher financial investment opportunities relative to non-financial investment 
opportunities-- on managers' decision-making. Results showed that when viewed separately, 
buybacks and dividends each do have negative effects on R&D investment for firms; the 
crowding-out effect was also shown to have a negative correlation with R&D investment. Put 
together, these results would suggest that the presence of a buyback would lead to a heightened 
chance that R&D investment decreases in the subsequent year. However, one main limitation of 
this study was that significant results were only obtained for years after the Asian Financial 
Crisis (2001-2009) while years 1994-1998 did not yield significant results one way or another. 
This suggests that the results obtained from this paper may not be very conclusive because the 
decreases R&D investment and planning horizons could be due to the fact that firms were cash-
strapped, needed to cut costs, and had few net present investment opportunities for the years that 
the negative relationship was suggested.  
 Results obtained by Li (2011) corroborate results obtained by Kahle (2002), and put 
doubt towards the school of thought that argues that stock buybacks necessarily dampen 
innovation. While examining the relationship between financial constraints and R&D 
investments, Li (2011) used a sample of 1,333 firm-year combinations from 1975 to 2007 to 
estimate the effect of financial constraints on both intensity of R&D and returns to R&D. Li 
found that less financially constrained firms, as measured through surplus equity as well as 
higher earnings and cash flow, were more likely to have higher returns to R&D and tended to 
invest more in R&D than firms that were more financially constrained. However, this sheds light 
on the relationship between stock buybacks and R&D, as results obtained by authors such as 
Firth and Yeung (2005) indicate that the same metrics indicating lack of financial constraints and 
higher propensity to invest in R&D are correlated with the decision to engage in stock buybacks. 
Furthermore, the investment opportunities hypothesis-- the notion that R&D reactions are 
positive for high-tech firms and negative for low-tech firms-- was tested by Szeqcyk et al. (1996) 
using a inter-industry sample of 252 R&D increase announcements from 1979 to 1992. Through 
time series analyses, authors' results suggested a significant positive response for high-tech firms 
and a significantly negative response for low-tech firms. This has important implications for 
managerial decisions to either allocate funds towards buybacks or R&D, because it suggests that 
high-tech firms may be more likely to invest in R&D over buybacks because they have more of a 
market financial incentive to do so. These results also suggest that older, less high-tech 
companies would be less inclined to invest in R&D because markets may perceive that as an 
unproductive allocation of resources. So, this may mean that low-tech companies may be more 
inclined to buy back stock because there is a lower opportunity cost compared to spending the 
same fund on R&D. Although work done by Szeqcyk et al. (1996) has important implications 
regarding the opportunity costs of investing in R&D versus investing in stock buybacks, one 
serous limitation of the study is its small sample size of only 252 R&D increase announcements. 
Brown, Fazzari, and Peterson (2009) examined the relationship between financing and R&D 
throughout the 1990’s. They corroborate the conclusions of Szeqcyk et al. (1996) as they find a 
positive effect of financing in the form of cash flow and external equity for young, and especially 
high-tech firms, but not for mature companies. Their conclusion is that the impact of financing 
on R&D for small, start-up firms is large enough to have a significant impact on the U.S. 
economy. However, for small firms the use of financing for R&D is imperative, because they are 
disrupting industries and by the nature of their companies’ sizes a lot of financing for R&D is 
required to fulfill rapid growth. The impact that net stock issuance and financing has on large 
companies, however, is more contentiously debated. However, if financing for R&D is less 
imperative for large companies, then that may suggest that the choice between investing in R&D 
and putting cash towards stock buybacks may not necessarily be a tradeoff. This would 
contradict the substitution hypothesis, and would go against the arguments of Lazonick (2015) 
and Lev et al (2016).  
 Overall, several authors such as Kahle (2002) and Chan et al. (2001) do find results to be 
consistent with the hypothesis that managers may use stock buybacks to the advantage of long-
term shareholders. So, the results of these authors stand in contrast to those of Lazonick (2015) 
and Lev et al. (2016) because these authors' results imply that the companies that choose to 
engage in buybacks are making a rational investment decision, and that company executives are 
making this decision with the interests of their shareholders in mind and this decision would not 
lead to long-term declines in research & development. On the other hand, anti-buyback authors 
argue that stock buybacks are shortsighted decisions to enrich company executives at the 
expense of shareholders' long-term interest, and that they come at the expense of research & 
development. Chan et al. (2001) and Kahle (2002) seem to be different schools of thought than 
Lazonick (2015), and uses a much more robust empirical models, who generally makes points 
through examples and situational analysis instead of empiricism. Because of this, there is a lot of 
room for error in Lazonick's argument due to the fact that it is possible for companies to amass 
huge amounts of corporate surplus, while not having any net present value investment activities 
in which to invest all of the cash and other liquid assets that they have. Under this scenario, 
Lazonick's argument becomes much weaker because he assumes that stock buybacks are perfect 
substitutes for R&D expenditures, wages, and other investments, which may not be the case.  
 The literature contains mixed results regarding the reasons that companies have for 
buying back stock: signaling, options-funding, and flexibility hypotheses. The relationship 
between buybacks and R&D is also contested, as the two main schools of thought in the debate 
over stock buybacks as harmful or harmless use different methodologies. Papers such as 
Lazonick (2015) and Lev et al. (2016) present buybacks as harmful to innovation through an 
examination of the business realities, but may not provide robust enough empirical models and 
accompanying reasons for any sort of causal relationship between stock buybacks and decreased 
R&D spending. On the other hand, many of the papers that do provide empirical frameworks and 
suggest that buybacks are not harmful to R&D have significant limitations. While Kahle (2002) 
found a complementary relationship between buybacks and R&D, and Lev et al. (2016) 
supported the notion that efficient two-way financing helps mitigate the risk of R&D 
underinvestment, results still do not completely take into account the effect that increased 
earnings and returns might have on the effects between stock buybacks and R&D. My paper 
seeks to contribute to the literature by using controlling for several important variables including 
returns, cash levels, and metrics of whether firms are high-tech or low-tech.  
 
 
 
 
Part 3: Data Extraction & Cleaning with Python Scripting 
 Data was obtained through Mergent Online's database of company financial information, 
as well as Market Watch's list of historic stock buybacks. Income statement and business ratio 
data from 455 Fortune 500 companies was obtained from Mergent Online, and a complete list of 
historical share repurchase agreements was obtained through Market Watch. Data from both of 
these sources were integrated and cleaned via a Python script to convert the data into usable 
tabular formats, and to structure the data set in. Python's "Pandas" module was used for this 
script because this module combines the detail-oriented nature of the Python programming 
language with the user-friendly nature of the R programming language, allowing for the use of 
"DataFrames" for relatively convenient data organization.  
 The Python script scrapes buyback information and R&D information, with several 
control variables are included. The program iterates through a text file of raw company financial 
information to append Income Statement items representing Research & Development expenses 
to a DataFrame. Firm symbol, report date, various business ratios, as well as SIC and NAISC 
codes, are also appended to each respective observation of R & D expenses. This process builds 
a data set that only consists of firms with line items that specifically represent R & D 
expenditure. Then, buyback data from Market Watch is integrated by using firm symbol and 
report date as a unique identifier, matching stock buyback information for a given year to its 
appropriate firm. Note that buyback data, along with control variables, are shifted up by one 
year. Change in R&D is calculated as the difference in R&D expenditures from the previous year 
to the current year. This structures the data such that a buyback, along with various control 
variables, in one year is predicting the change in R&D expenditures from the end-of-year 
reporting period of the buyback year to the end-of-year reporting period of the year after the 
buyback. In addition to the creation of change in R&D, a dummy variable for change in R&D is 
created in preparation for the logit regressions-- this variable tracks whether R & D expenditures 
increase or decrease from the end-of-year reporting period of the buyback year to the end-of-year 
reporting period following the buyback year (1 or 0). Note that every last row (formerly 
representing values from 2009) for each firm is dropped because independent and control 
variables were all shifted up from that row. 
 
 
Part 4: Data and Variables 
 The final, cleaned data set contains 702 observations from 81 firms over a period of 2009 
through 2018. There are 239 buybacks present in the data throughout this period. The "buyback" 
independent variable is a dummy variable in the data set, where a value of 1 signifies a buyback 
in a given year and a buyback of 0 signifies the lack of a buyback in a given year. The dependent 
variable in the logit regression of change in R&D expenditures (RDDum) is also a dummy 
variable, where 1 means that R&D spending increased throughout the time period and a 0 means 
that R & D spending decreased throughout the time period. RDDUMit is the movement in R & D 
(up and down signified by 1 and 0, respectively) for firm i from the end of year t-1 to the end of 
year t, and BBit represents whether (1 or 0) there was a buyback for firm i in year t-1. The 
dependent variable in the OLS regression is the percentage change in R&D— common sized 
with revenue—as opposed to the logit regression where the dependent variable is revenue.  
Control variables include Return on Assets (ROA), EBITDA, Quick Ratio (QR), 
Property, Plant, & Equipment Turnover (PPET), Total Asset Turnover (TAT), and Cash Flow 
per Share (CFPS). ROAit is return on assets (net income/total assets) for firm i in year t, and 
EBITDAit is earnings before income taxes, depreciation, and amortization for firm i in year t.  
QRit is the quick ratio (liquid assets/current liabilities) for firm i in year t, and PPETit is property, 
plant, and equipment turnover (net sales/fixed assets - Accumulated depreciation) for firm i in 
year t. Finally, TATit is total asset turnover (total sales/((beginning assets + ending assets)/2)) for 
firm i in year t. CFPSit is cash flow per share for firm i in year t.  
 Previous literature informs the selection of the various control variables that will be 
jointly used to predict the impact that stock buybacks have on R&D. This section delves into the 
literary findings regarding these variables, and informs why they are being used in this model. 
Firstly, Return on Assets (ROA) for companies is included as a control variable because previous 
work has shown there to be a feedback loop between R&D expenditure and return on assets 
(ROA). Results from an inter-industry study of R&D "leaders" and "peers" throughout 1976-
2012 conducted by Jiang et al. (2015) suggested that R&D successes from "leaders" spill over 
across companies in the same industries. Following these R&D successes, R&D "peers" 
experience higher returns on assets as they must simultaneously increase their R&D budgets to 
keep up with the increased rate of innovation in the industry. As ROA increases with this intra-
industy R&D intensity, this creates a dynamic where R&D and ROA have are likely 
complementary metrics. Shust (2014) corroborates this positive correlation between 
discretionary accruals and R&D, while also noting that EBITDA and cash flow have been shown 
to be positively correlated with R&D expenditures, by suggesting that they are variables 
inextricably tied to return on assets and discretionary accruals. Furthermore Firth and Yeung 
(2005) suggest that positive cash flows induce managers to buy back stock as they show that 
cash flows may be an important control for factors co-occurring with repurchase decisions that 
affect R&D. Additionally, Howe & McFetridge (1976) studied the effects of depreciation on 
R&D across three major industry groups (Electrical, Chemical, Machinery) from 1967 to 1971 
using 256 panel observations (Howe & McFetridge, 1976). While using sales and after-tax 
profits as proxies for cash flow, their results suggested cash flows to be a key determinant of 
R&D expenditures. When contextualized with the works of previous authors such as Jiang et 
al.(2015), Shust (2014), and Howe & McFetridge (1976), cash flow is an important control 
metric because it captures information related to impacts on both the dependent variable and 
most important control variable. Additionally, results obtained by Li (2011) indicated that sales 
and earnings growth are important determinants of financial-constraint reduction that serve to 
incentivize investment in R&D; this provides further suggestions that control variables for 
earnings, such as EBITDA and cash flow, are important to the model.  
 In addition to metrics that track returns in earnings such as return on assets (ROA), 
EBITDA, cash flow, and the quick ratio (QR), it was necessary to include indicators for how 
"high-tech" or "low-tech" a company is; I chose to do this using Total Asset Turnover (TAT) and 
Property, Plant, & Equipment Turnover (PPET). Previously mentioned, Howe & McFetridge 
(1976) also used depreciation as a control variable while predicting R&D expenditures across 
electrical, chemical, and machinery industries. Depreciation had a statistically significant 
positive effect on rates of R&D in the machinery industry, but did not have significant results for 
the other two industries. Nevertheless, intuitively the more a company innovates the more its 
innovations will eventually depreciate and amortize. So, I found it to be necessary to include 
Property, Plant, & Equipment Turnover (PPET) as a control variable in the model. Additionally, 
there needed to be a control variable that takes into account how high-tech or low-tech a firm is. 
Work conducted by Szeqcyk et al. (1996) indicates the clear importance of taking into account 
the level at which a firm is overvalued, as well as the level at which a firm is using its assets and 
depreciating it's current assets, as these factors are all critical in determining the amount of R&D 
that a firm decides to invest in. While Szeqcyk et al. (1996) chose to use Tobin's q for this, I 
chose to use a few other business metrics to control for similar effects of Tobin's q. Whereas 
Tobin's q uses the ratio of market value to book value of a firm to track how "high tech" a firm 
is, I chose to do so through the use of turnover metrics such as Total Asset Turnover (TAT) and 
Property, Plant, & Equipment Turnover (PPET). The reasoning behind this is that firms in the 
sample that are "higher tech", such as technology companies and pharmaceutical companies, will 
have a higher ratios of earnings to both total assets and property, plant, & equipment.  
 
Part 5: Discussion 
 Two models were conducted: a logit model to estimate the effect that stock buybacks 
have on the chances that a company increases R&D expenditures in the following year, and an 
OLS regression for estimating the effect of stock buybacks on the percentage increase in R&D 
throughout the subsequent year. The logit regression consists of the following form:  
 
RDDUMit = β0 + β1BBit +  βnCit 
 
Where RDDUMit is a dummy variable for the direction of change in R & D (up and down 
signified by 1 and 0, respectively) for firm i from the end of year t-1 to the end of year t, and BBit 
represents whether or not (BB = {0, 1}) there was a buyback for firm i in year t-1. Cit represents 
the various control variables used in regressions 1 through 11, each of which was mentioned in 
part 3. Additionally, an OLS regression is used to predict the estimated effect (%) of the presence 
of a stock buyback from one period to the next. This takes the probit regression a step further to 
provide a more precise estimation of change in R&D, and uses dependent variable of the actual 
percentage change of R&D expenditure in the subsequent year following a buyback. The OLS 
regression consists of the following form: 
RDit = β0 + β1BBit +  βnCit 
Where RDit is percentage change in R&D, and the independent variable BBit as well as all other 
control variables represented by Cit are the same as in the logit regression.  
 The results of the logit model regression using random effects are shown in table 4. 
Results for the OLS model are shown in Table 5, with each regression using the same variables 
as its respective regression in the logit models. Regressions 1 and 2 respectively estimate the 
impact of buybacks and return on assets (ROA), as well as buybacks and EBITDA, on the 
probability of R&D spending increasing (decreasing) throughout the next period. Regressions 3 
and 4 include the Quick Ratio (QR) as an additional control variable, and regressions 5 and 6 
include property, plant, and equipment turnover (PPET) as an additional control variable on top 
of the variables in regressions 3 and 4. Regressions 7 and 8 interchange PPE turnover for total 
asset turnover (TAT) to include intangible assets. Regression 9 includes cash flow per share 
(CFPS), the quick ratio (QR), and ROA as control variables, and regression 10 mirrors 
regression 9 but interchanges ROA for EBITDA. Regression 11 only uses cash flow per share 
(CFPS) as a control variable.  
 
Section 5.1: Robustness Checks 
 Pearson R values were calculated to test for multi-collinearity. Python can do this quite 
easily by creating a Pearson's R correlation plot, which shows the Pearson's R values for each 
pair of variables in the data set. Table 1 below shows the Pearson's R correlation matrix for the 
data set. As shown, the only variable pairs that have significant multi-collinearity are ROA and 
EBITDA, as well as PPET and TAT. Correlation between ROA and EBITDA is clearly shown 
through their Pearson R of .778, and correlation between PPET and TAT is shown through their 
Pearson R value of .636. I was sure to not use either of these two variable pairs in the same 
regressions with one another.  
 VIF results were also calculated to test for collinearity-- these results are shown in Table 
2. In order to do this, a single OLS regression using all independent variables was run, and VIF 
statistics for all variables were calculated. As shown in the table, EBITDA and ROA have high 
VIF values of 3.39 and 3.24 respectively, so they are likely correlated with other independent 
variables in the model-- namely, each other. This corroborates the Pearson R results from the 
correlation plot. TAT and PPET have relatively high VIF statistics as well, which makes sense 
due to their high Pearson R calculation of .636. Although these variable pairs both have high 
Pearson R values and higher-than-average VIF results, their VIF results do not give strong 
evidence that they should be excluded from the model, but as previously stated the R values for 
both of the pairs indicate that they should not be used in the same regression. Overall, there does 
not seem to be rampant multi-collinearity between multiple variables in the model.   
 When comparing the fixed effects model to the random effects model, the Hausman test 
coefficients yield values of .38, .19, .1, .15, .17, .26, .6, .1, .05, .007, and .25 respectively. These 
results are shown in Table 3, and show that by and large, the vast majority of tests cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that there is no correlation between unique errors and the variables in the 
model, which thereby rejects the idea that the fixed effects model is the best estimator. 
Therefore, these results indicate that the random effects model is most appropriate and this is the 
model that will be analyzed.  
 
Section 5.1: Discussion of Results 
 The results for the random effects logit model are in Table 4. Results for the independent 
variable, the presence of a stock buyback, estimate that the presence of a stock buyback are 
correlated with an increase in the likelihood of R&D expenditures increasing over the next year. 
The magnitude of this effect is an approximate 50-60% in the chance of an increase for R&D 
expenditures depending on the control variables used, and these results are statistically 
significant at the 95% level for all regressions in the table. ROA is also significant at the 95% 
level and predicts that a 1 percent increase for return on assets leads to an expected 2.8 to 3.0% 
increase in the chance of R & D increasing in the year following the buyback. Furthermore, 
EBITDA is also significant at the 95% level and predicts that a 1 percent increase for return on 
assets leads to an expected 1.4 to 1.7% increase in the chance of R&D increasing in the year 
following the buyback.  None of the other control variables that are used are significant in this 
model. The quick ratio yielded a negative sign for its coefficient, which was unexpected given 
the previous findings of the literature, and cash flow per share yielded a positive sign for its 
coefficient, which was expected given the previous findings of the literature. OLS regression 
results are shown in Table 5. The independent variable, the presence of a stock buyback, is not 
significant at any level below 20%. Furthermore, none of the control variables are statistically 
significant either. The most statistically significant variable is EBITDA, which is consistently 
significant across all regression specifications. Total Asset Turnover does also appear to be 
significant in regression 8. This partly corroborates work previously done throughout the 
literature because total assets is correlated with higher liquid assets-- liquid assets are what cause 
companies to buy back stock as they attempt to convey that liquidity to investors.  
 Results from the logit regressions suggest that stock buybacks are actually positively 
correlated with increases in R&D expenditure, as well with high earnings and returns on assets. 
OLS regression results yield similar signs for variables, but it is hard to draw any meaningful 
conclusions from them due to statistical insignificance. This suggests that stock buybacks are 
being conducted on behalf of innovative and successful companies that are rewarding and 
compensating investors through buybacks. This observed correlation between stock buybacks 
and R&D increases corroborates results found by Kahle (2002), Tan et al. (2011, and Li (2011) 
which found that the same factors that typically contribute to high rates of dividends and 
buybacks are also highly correlated with R&D expenditures. This implies that companies are not 
necessarily substituting R&D expenditures for stock buybacks, contradicting the work done by 
Lazonick (2015), Lev et al. (2016), and Hwan et. al (2012). However, it is important to note that 
this study's sample size is occurring during a period of economic growth, which likely increased 
the rates of both buybacks and R&D increases. This is one potential reason as to why the results 
obtained differ from those of Hwan et al (2012), because the results obtained by Hwan et al. 
(2012) that showed slowdowns in R&D due to financialization were only significant for years 
after the Asian financial crisis.  Cash flow per share was not a significant variable, corroborating 
the results of Chan et al. (2004) which did not find any evidence to support the free cash flow 
hypothesis. This negation of the free cash flow hypothesis provides some support for the theory 
of stock buybacks as a signaling tool for undervalued stocks, instead of a method for returning 
excess cash to shareholders. Additionally, since buybacks are correlated with high return on 
assets as well as high earnings, results provide support for the signaling hypothesis as they 
support the notion that companies with high returns on assets as well as earnings are using stock 
buybacks as a tool to indicate that their stocks are undervalued. This evidence is in line with 
results obtained by Chan et. al. (2004) in a short-term analysis providing support for the theory, 
but contradict results obtained by Lamba and Miranda (2010). Additionally, these results suggest 
support for the signaling hypothesis for long-term planning horizons since buybacks are 
correlated with increased R&D; in doing so these results contradict the work of Liano et. al. 
(2003). No significant conclusions regarding the leveraging or stock-option hypotheses can be 
made from these results. 
 
 
Section 5.2: Limitations  
 First off, there were very few variables with negative coefficients in both the OLS and 
Logit models, which means that much of the negative effects that were present were likely 
lumped into the error term and/or some of the positive coefficients. This could likely explain the 
reason as to why the quick ratio had an expected negative coefficient, despite the fact that it high 
ratios of liquid assets to liabilities had been found to increase R & D rates in the literature. 
Secondly, there are likely other variables that it would be useful to include that would be helpful 
in predicting Research & Development expenditures. An example of one of these is Tobin's Q, 
which tracks whether a firm is high-tech or low-tech based on the ratio of its market value to its 
book value. Furthermore, Cash flow is measured through cash flow per share, and there is no 
standard benchmark for the number of shares outstanding. Therefore, firms that have fewer 
(more) shares would have disproportionately higher (lower) cash flows per share-- which may 
not be completely representative of actual cash flow.  
 Another limitation-- possibly the biggest overall limitation-- is that buybacks may be 
endogenous to the model. All of the 80 firms examined in this research are firms that specifically 
have R&D listed as a line item on their Income Statements, which means that it is not a true 
inter-industry analysis. From the onset, this means that these companies are more high tech than 
other large multinational corporations that do not have R&D listed as an individual line item. 
High tech companies typically are faster growing companies, with relatively high levels of cash, 
which must spend ever-increasing amounts of that cash on research & development from year-
to-year in order to stay afloat in industries where technological disruption is constant. 
Furthermore, these companies typically have high returns on assets because they are growing so 
rapidly, and investors expect to have some of these gains transferred to them largely through the 
use of stock buybacks. So it would make sense that these high tech companies would, in times of 
excess cash, simultaneously use that cash on the research that is required to stay relevant while 
also conveying some of that cash to shareholder through the use of stock buybacks.  
 
Part 6: Conclusions 
 This study set out to determine whether or not stock buybacks have a significant impact 
on rates of innovation for large Fortune 500 companies, as measured through their R&D 
expenditures. Using logit regression analysis, the model finds stock buybacks to be correlated 
with increases in R&D expenditure for subsequent years following buybacks. OLS regression 
results also find repurchases to be correlated with increased R&D expenditures in subsequent 
years, but do not appear to yield statistically significant results. These findings may be partially 
due to joint correlations whereby firms that have excess cash to spend on stock buybacks also 
have excess cash with which to pursue new and innovative opportunities. Further research is 
necessary to gain a better understanding of the effects that stock buybacks have on R&D. First 
off, future studies could expand analysis to encompass more indicators of innovation than just 
the Income Statement line item of R&D. This would allow for a more comprehensive analysis of 
how stock buybacks affect innovation across industries that span the spectrum of innovation 
intensity. Additionally, while this paper seeks to estimate the immediate effect of share 
repurchases on R&D, it does not consider the longer-term implications of repurchases. 
A study tracking innovation over multi-year time horizons would provide more insight into the 
longer-term effects that stock buybacks have on innovation.  
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Table 4: Random-Effects Logit Predictors for R&D Movements 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES Change 
in R&D 
Change 
in R&D 
Change 
in R&D 
Change 
in R&D 
Change 
in R&D 
Change 
in R&D 
Change 
in R&D 
Change 
in R&D 
Change 
in R&D 
Change 
in R&D 
Change 
in R&D 
Buyback = 1 0.514**
* 
0.579**
* 
0.511**
* 
0.577**
* 
0.509**
* 
0.573**
* 
0.507**
* 
0.553**
* 
0.516**
* 
0.577**
* 
0.602**
* 
 (0.173) (0.170) (0.173) (0.170) (0.174) (0.171) (0.174) (0.172) (0.174) (0.171) (0.171) 
 [2.974] [3.399] [2.950] [3.391] [2.924] [3.342] [2.913] [3.206] [2.970] [3.376] [3.524] 
Return on Assets 
(%) 
0.028**
* 
 0.030**
* 
 0.030**
* 
 0.030**
* 
 0.028**   
 (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)   
 [2.718]  [2.738]  [2.737]  [2.708]  [2.508]   
EBITDA (%)  0.014**
* 
 0.016**
* 
 0.016**
* 
 0.017**
* 
 0.015**
* 
 
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
  [2.735]  [2.808]  [2.809]  [2.903]  [2.592]  
Quick Ratio (%)   -0.031 -0.052 -0.031 -0.051 -0.027 -0.040 -0.031 -0.051  
   (0.063) (0.065) (0.063) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.063) (0.065)  
   [-0.495] [-0.796] [-0.488] [-0.784] [-0.413] [-0.599] [-0.495] [-0.788]  
Property, Plant, & 
Equipment 
Turnover (%) 
    0.001 0.001      
     (0.007) (0.007)      
     [0.081] [0.209]      
Total Asset 
Turnover (%) 
      0.042 0.199    
       (0.177) (0.185)    
       [0.236] [1.077]    
Cash Flow Per 
Share (%) 
        0.011 0.015 0.021 
         (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
         [0.685] [0.943] [1.276] 
Number of firms 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Z-scores in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 Table 5: OLS Predictors for R&D Movements 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VARIAB
LES 
Change 
in R&D 
(%) 
Change 
in R&D 
(%) 
Change 
in R&D 
(%) 
Change 
in R&D 
(%) 
Change 
in R&D 
(%) 
Change 
in R&D 
(%) 
Change 
in R&D 
(%) 
Change 
in R&D 
(%) 
Change 
in R&D 
(%) 
Change 
in R&D 
(%) 
Change 
in R&D 
(%) 
            
Buyback = 
1 
0.351 0.306 0.352 0.305 0.341 0.287 0.301 0.202 0.360 0.320 0.391 
 (0.324) (0.316) (0.325) (0.316) (0.328) (0.319) (0.328) (0.319) (0.330) (0.320) (0.323) 
 [1.082] [0.969] [1.085] [0.966] [1.038] [0.899] [0.919] [0.634] [1.093] [0.999] [1.208] 
Return on 
Assets (%) 
0.008  0.007  0.007  0.006  0.009   
 (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.019)   
 [0.441]  [0.393]  [0.391]  [0.306]  [0.468]   
EBITDA 
(%) 
 0.033**
* 
 0.037**
* 
 0.037**
* 
 0.040**
* 
 0.038**
* 
 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  
  [3.870]  [4.051]  [4.059]  [4.353]  [4.066]  
Quick Ratio 
(%) 
  0.013 -0.141 0.016 -0.138 0.050 -0.099 0.020 -0.132  
   (0.114) (0.116) (0.114) (0.116) (0.118) (0.117) (0.115) (0.117)  
   [0.118] [-1.216] [0.137] [-1.191] [0.421] [-0.842] [0.170] [-1.123]  
Property, 
Plant, & 
Equipment 
Turnover 
(%) 
    0.003 0.005      
     (0.012) (0.012)      
     [0.262] [0.400]      
Total Asset 
Turnover 
(%) 
      0.365 0.620**    
       (0.312) (0.312)    
       [1.170] [1.983]    
Cash Flow 
Per Share 
(%) 
        -0.019 -0.031 -0.015 
         (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) 
         [-0.613] [-1.024] [-0.496] 
            
R-
squared 
0.002 0.023 0.002 0.025 0.002 0.025 0.004 0.031 0.003 0.026 0.002 
            
Standard errors in parentheses 
Z-scores in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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